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Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation: 
Evidence from US Patents†
By David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, Gary Pisano,  
and Pian Shu*
Manufacturing accounts for more than three-quarters of US 
 c orporate patents. The competitive shock to this sector emanating 
from China’s economic ascent could in theory either augment or 
 stifle US innovation. Using three decades of US patents matched 
to corporate owners, we quantify how foreign competition affects 
domestic innovation. Rising import exposure intensifies  competitive 
pressure, reducing sales, profitability, and R&D expenditure at US 
firms. Accounting for confounding sectoral patenting trends, we 
find that US patent production declines in sectors facing greater 
import competition. This adverse effect is larger among initially less 
 profitable and less capital-intensive firms. (JEL F14, L11, L60, O19, 
O31, O34, P33)
Despite accounting for less than one-tenth of US private nonfarm employment, 
US manufacturing still generates more than two-thirds of US R&D spending and 
corporate patents.1 In light of China’s spectacular growth in manufacturing exports, 
the potential impact of import competition on innovation by domestic firms has 
gained relevance.2 In this paper, we study the effect of rising import competition on 
US innovation at the firm level.
How product market competition affects innovation is of long-standing  theoretical 
interest.3 Schumpeterian models posit that a more competitive  product market 
reduces firm profit margins, resulting in lower investments in innovative activity 
(e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980). But as Arrow (1962) noted, when  competitive 
1 Helper, Krueger, and Wial (2012) compute a manufacturing share in US R&D spending of 68 percent based 
on data from the National Science Foundation’s Business R&D and Innovation Survey. In our data, manufacturing 
accounts for 71 percent of all corporate patents with US-based inventors and an application year of 2007.
2 A substantial literature shows that import competition from China has contributed to job loss in US 
 manufacturing (e.g., Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Autor et al. 2014; Pierce 
and Schott 2016; Acemoglu et al. 2016).
3 See Gilbert (2006) and Cohen (2010).
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pressure is low and pre-innovation rents are high, firms may have little incentive 
to invest in innovation. Aghion et  al. (2005) formalize these competing insights, 
showing how differences between pre- and post-innovation rents determine a firm’s 
response to competition. This response depends on the dispersion in technological 
advancement across firms. When dispersion is low, intensified competition encour-
ages firms to innovate to “escape competition.” When dispersion is high, more com-
petition may stifle innovation among laggard enterprises.4
Following a large literature (Cohen 2010), we measure innovation using firm 
patenting and R&D expenditure, which we supplement with firm-level data on 
sales, investment, and profitability.5 We match the assignees of all US  patents 
granted between 1975 and 2013 to publicly held firms listed in Compustat through 
2014 using a search-engine-based algorithm that disambiguates  inconsistently 
spelled and abbreviated renditions of firm names on patent applications. 
Following Autor et al. (2014), we isolate the industry-specific component of US 
import growth that is driven by export-supply growth in China by instrumenting 
rising US import  competition with contemporaneous changes in industry-level 
import  penetration in other high-income countries. Using alternative  identification 
 strategies (Bloom, Draca, and  Van  Reenen 2016; Pierce and  Schott 2016), we 
obtain comparable results.
We first show that increased imports from China ramped up competitive pressure 
on publicly listed US firms, reducing US and global sales, diminishing book and 
stock values, curtailing purchases of labor and capital inputs, and proportionally 
reducing R&D investment. We next show that this increase in competitive pressure 
led US firms to decrease their output of innovations as measured by patent grants. 
These negative effects are confirmed when using two alternative measures of trade 
exposure based on changes in trade policy, neither of which is likely to be driven 
by technology trends: the US grant of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) 
to China in 2000 and the scheduled elimination of Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) 
quotas in 2005. Notably, the induced fall in patents is roughly proportional to the 
contraction of sales, employment, capital, and R&D expenditure at import-compet-
ing firms.
To overcome the fact that our firm-level analysis necessarily excludes patents 
granted to firms that are not listed in Compustat, we exploit the observation that all 
patents are assigned a technology class regardless of corporate ownership, which 
allows us to estimate the effect of import competition on patenting at the technology 
class level. Consistent with the firm-level results, we find that technology classes 
with greater growth in import penetration saw a substantial relative decline in corpo-
rate patents during our analytic window of 1991–2007. We find no similar decline in 
 patenting by noncorporate entities (e.g., governments and universities),  indicating 
that our key findings are specific to private sector innovation and do not reflect 
underlying correlations between innovation opportunities and rising trade exposure.
4 The prediction is unclear for firms that are technological leaders. Additional causal mechanisms raise further 
ambiguity. See Hart (1983), Bloom et al. (2014), and Chen and Steinwender (2019) as well as Shu and Steinwender 
(2019) for a synthesis of this literature.
5 On using patents to measure innovation, see Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) and Moser (2016). On the economic 
value of patents, see Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Kogan et al. (2017).
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Our results stand in contrast to those of Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) 
for European firms and highlight the underlying theoretical ambiguity in the rela-
tionships between  competition and innovation. We speculate that the differential 
impacts of  foreign competition on domestic innovation in the United States versus 
Europe may be  reconciled through the lens of Aghion et al. (2005): US industries 
have been found to display larger gaps in the technological capabilities of leading 
and lagging firms when compared to firms in Europe (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and 
Scarpetta 2013; Hashmi 2013). We  provide suggestive evidence in support of the 
Aghion et al. (2005) model by  showing that within the United States, the negative 
effects of import competition concentrate on firms that are initially less productive 
and less profitable.
Our work is contemporaneous to emerging evidence on the impacts of import 
competition on innovation-related outcomes in North America.6 Xu and Gong 
(2017) and Hombert and  Matray (2018) also use Compustat data to show that 
import  competition has a negative impact on firms’ R&D expenditure and  financial 
 outcomes. Xu and  Gong (2017) further show that R&D is reallocated toward 
more productive firms, and Hombert and Matray (2018) find that firms with large 
R&D stocks mitigate the negative impact of import competition through product 
 differentiation. Kueng, Li, and Yang (2016) find that more trade-exposed Canadian 
firms experience strong declines in self-reported innovation outcomes. We contrib-
ute to this literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Chinese 
import competition on both output (patenting) and input (R&D expenditure) of firm 
innovation in the United States. Our analysis accounts for industry pre-trends and 
establishes robustness to a wide range of identification strategies. Consistent with 
a competitive market response, we find that Chinese import competition reduces 
 innovation at both the firm and technology class levels in the US private sector.
I. Measuring Trade Exposure
To measure import penetration, we match trade data to US manufacturing 
 industries. In a second step, we match industry-level trade exposure to firm-level 
data, which we then match to patent records. The online Appendix provides further 
details.
To create measures of changing import penetration, we match trade data to 
 four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) US manufacturing industries 
using the UN Comtrade Database and the crosswalk in Pierce and Schott (2012). 
Our baseline measure of trade exposure is the change in the import penetration ratio 
for a US manufacturing industry over the period 1991 to 2007, defined as
(1)  ∆IP jτ =  
∆ M j,τ 
UC 
  _____________  
 Y j, 91 +  M j, 91 −  E j, 91 
, 
where for US industry  j,  ∆  M j ,τ 
UC is the change in imports from China over two 
 subperiods, 1991 to 1999 and 1999 to 2007, and  Y j, 91 +  M j, 91 −  E j, 91 is initial 
6 An extended set of results are available in our earlier working paper, Autor et al. (2017).
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absorption (industry shipments,  Y j, 91 , plus industry imports,  M j, 91 , minus industry 
exports,  E j, 91 ) at the start of the period. We choose 1991 as the starting year for the 
analysis as it is the earliest period for which we have disaggregated bilateral trade 
data to match to US manufacturing industries.7
Observed changes in import penetration may in part reflect domestic shocks 
to US industries that determine both US import demand and innovative  activity. 
Even if the dominant factors driving China’s export growth are internal  supply 
shocks, US industry import demand shocks may still contaminate bilateral trade 
flows. To  capture this supply-driven component in US imports from China, 
we follow Autor  et  al. (2014) and instrument for trade exposure in (1) with the 
variable
(2)  ∆IPO j τ =  
∆ M j, τ 
OC 
  _____________  
 Y j, 88 +  M j, 88 −  X j, 88 
,
where  ∆ M j, τ 
OC is the growth in imports from China in industry  j during the period  τ 
for a group of eight industrialized countries that does not include the United States.8 
The denominator in (2) is initial absorption in the industry in 1988. The motiva-
tion for the instrument in (2) is that high-income economies are similarly exposed 
to growth in imports from China that is driven by supply shocks such as expand-
ing product variety, falling prices, rising quality, and diminishing trade and tariff 
costs in China’s surging sectors. The identifying assumption is that industry import 
demand shocks are uncorrelated across high-income economies. Autor, Dorn, and 
Hanson (2013) and Autor et al. (2014) provide evidence on the robustness of this 
instrumentation approach in studying the China trade shock. We complement this 
strategy by also using the identification approaches of Pierce and Schott (2016) and 
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) as discussed in Section IIIC.
II. Evidence of Increased Competitive Pressure from Imports
Prior to assessing the impact of rising Chinese import competition on  realized 
 innovation outcomes, we verify that this force exerts significant competitive 
 pressure on import-competing firms, measured by sales, profitability, and R&D 
investment.9 For our analysis, we match industry-level trade exposure to Compustat 
North America, which provides industry affiliation and financial statement data 
on  companies whose shares are traded at a North American stock exchange.10 We 
 estimate the following regression model using these matched data:
7 Our empirical approach requires trade data reported under Harmonized System (HS) product codes in order 
to match with US SIC industries. The year 1991 is the earliest in which many countries began using the HS 
classification.
8 These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland, 
which represent the high-income countries for which we can obtain disaggregated bilateral HS trade data back to 
1991.
9 These results corroborate literature on the consequences of the China trade shock. See footnote 2, Xu and Gong 
(2017), and Hombert and Matray (2018).
10 Compustat covers companies that have at least one regularly, actively, and publicly traded issue listed on a 
US or Canadian exchange and that provide a regular filing of financial reports. The data include  foreign companies 
that use American Depository Receipts. The coverage of our data ends in 2014.
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(3)  ∆ Y ij τ =  α τ +  β 1 ∆IP j τ + γ X ij 0 +  e ij τ , 
where  ∆ Y ij τ is the change in a firm outcome for firm  i in industry  j over time period  τ , 
defined as  100 ×  ( Y ij, t1 −  Y ij, t 0 ) / (0.5 Y ij, t1 + 0.5 Y ij, t 0 ) , and  ∆I P j τ is growth of import 
exposure (in percentage points) for industry  j over period  τ , as defined in equation 
(1) and instrumented by  ∆IP O j τ , as defined in equation (2).
11 The control vector 
X ij 0 comprises time trends for 11 US manufacturing sectors. For  consistency with 
the analysis of firms’ patenting activity, observations are weighted by the number 
of firm patents, averaged over the start and end year of period  τ , though we obtain 
similar results when observations are weighted by firms’ US sales.
Table 1 reports results. The first two columns of panel A indicate that firms  facing 
an exogenous rise in Chinese import competition exhibit a relative decline in both US 
and global sales between 1991 and 2007. The former effect is  imprecisely  measured, 
while the latter estimate implies that global sales contract by  eight-tenths of a percent 
for each percentage point increase in Chinese import penetration. Columns 3 and 4 
report a corresponding decline in firm utilization of labor and  capital, suggesting an 
overall decrease in firms’ scale of operation. Consistent with these contractions, the 
book and stock market value of exposed firms falls by approximately  1.5 percent 
for every percentage point rise in import competition (columns 5 and 6). Column 7 
 indicates that R&D investment at import-competing firms drops roughly  one for one 
with rising import exposure, indicating a fall in inputs used in innovation.
11 We use the proportional change scaling of the outcome variable rather than the log change because some 
values of  Y are equal to zero.
Table 1—Effect of Chinese Import Competition on Firm Outcomes, 1991–2007 and 1975–1991 
(for falsification test). Dependent Variable: Change in Sales, Inputs, Firm Value, and R&D (in 
percentage  points)
Firm sales Firm global inputs Firm value R&D
United States Global Workers Capital Book Market Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Exposure period 1991–2007
∆ US industry exposure to  
 Chinese imports
−1.29 −0.79 −0.75 −1.28 −1.42 −1.65 −0.95
(1.07) (0.41) (0.41) (0.55) (0.71) (0.76) (0.39)
Mean outcome variable 32.94 54.42 19.92 55.55 −14.80 41.38 50.77
Observations 2,200 3,098 2,803 3,104 2,965 2,679 2,279
Panel B. Pre-period 1975–1991
∆ US industry exposure to  
 Chinese imports
0.47 0.48 0.21 0.80 0.54 0.28 0.79
(0.31) (0.40) (0.27) (0.49) (0.58) (0.50) (0.41)
Mean outcome variable 45.44 60.63 3.55 58.19 −4.84 58.73 72.87
Observations 1,971 2,188 2,084 2,178 2,162 1,872 1,453
Notes: Every regression in panel A comprises two stacked first differences, 1991–1999 and 1999–2007, and 
includes a period dummy and 11 indicator variables for broad sectors of manufacturing. The data includes all US 
firms for whom the indicated outcome variable is reported in Compustat at the start and end of a given period. 
The relative change of an outcome variable is defined as the first difference in the outcome over a period t, t + 1, 
divided by the average of the outcome across the two periods t and t + 1. Panel B provides falsification tests that 
regress the change in outcomes during the periods 1975–1983 and 1983–1991 on the future increase in Chinese 
import penetration, which is averaged over the 1991–1999 and 1999–2007 periods. All models are weighted by a 
firm’s US-inventor patents, averaged over the start and end of a period. Standard errors are clustered on four-digit 
SIC industries.
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Could these patterns merely reflect firm-level trends that predate the China shock? 
Panel B of Table 1 indicates otherwise. When we regress firm  outcomes during the 
pre-period of 1975–1991 on future change in Chinese imports occurring between 
1991 and 2007, we find that in seven of eight cases, the point estimates are insignif-
icant and in all cases the coefficients are opposite signed to those in panel A.
III. The Effect of Industry-Level Import Competition on Firm-Level Patenting
A. Firm-Level Data and Patent Matching
We combine Compustat data with utility patents from the US Patent and 
Inventor Database, which covers all patents granted by the US Patent and 
Trademark Office between 1975 and March 2013.12 A long-standing limitation 
of  patent records is that the firm names entered on patents frequently contain 
unusual  abbreviations or misspellings, which inhibit machine matching. We over-
come this problem with an algorithm that leverages the fact that internet search 
engines function as repositories of information on common spelling variations of 
company names.13 If “International Bussiness Machines” is a common misspell-
ing of IBM, an internet search engine will suggest IBM.com or IBM’s Wikipedia 
page as its top search results. Our algorithm enters the firm names appearing on 
patents and Compustat records into the Bing.com search engine and harvests the 
URLs of the search results. This procedure allows us to match patents to firms 
based on shared web search URLs in cases where the name strings on patents and 
firm records do not match exactly.14 Compared to the traditional string matching 
and  manual  inspection methods used in the NBER Patent Data Project, our pro-
cedure significantly improves  efficiency without sacrificing accuracy. Since our 
 search-engine-based algorithm minimizes the need for manual intervention, it is 
readily scalable. Our approach is generalizable to the matching between any two 
firm-level datasets and to many other applications in which string matching is 
complicated by  spelling variations. Section A of the online Appendix discusses 
our matching procedure in detail.
Our analysis uses utility patents applied for in the years 1975, 1983, 1991, 1999, 
and 2007. The 1991–1999 and 1999–2007 periods coincide with the surge in Chinese 
import competition; the 1975–1983 and 1983–1991 periods enable us to account for 
industry pre-trends. Since the mean difference between the patent  application and 
grant dates is 2.5 years in our data (standard deviation 1.5 years), right  censoring 
due to not observing patents granted after March 2013 is unlikely to pose a serious 
problem. We use inventors’ addresses listed on  patents to determine the location 
of invention and restrict our patent sample to corporate  patents with a US-based 
primary inventor. We match 72 percent of these  corporate patents to firms that 
appear in Compustat.15 Our patent sample consists of more than 170,000 patents 
12 The data are available at https://github.com/funginstitute/downloads. See Li et al. (2014) for a description.
13 On supervised approaches to matching patents to diambiguating patent assignees, see also Ventura, Nugent, 
and Fuchs (2015); Morrison, Riccaboni, and Pammolli (2017); and Balsmeier et al. (2018).
14 In the case of IBM, we identify 147 name variations on its patents (online Appendix, Table A1).
15 Unmatched corporate patents were likely granted to firms that were never public and thus lack a Compustat 
record.
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that  originate at 6,081 firms, which jointly accounted for 95  percent of all R&D 
expenditure that Compustat recorded in 1991.
Panel A of Figure 1 plots by year of patent application the total number of 
 patents with US-based primary inventors, corporate patents with US inventors, and 
 corporate patents with US inventors matched to Compustat. All three series show a 
sharp rise between 1983 and 1999 and a modest decline between 1999 and 2007.16 
The fourth series in the figure shows that the decline of patenting in the early 2000s 
coincides with a strong acceleration in US imports from China.
The aggregate trends in patenting shown in Figure 1, panel A mask important 
 heterogeneity in the shifting concentration of patenting across sectors. Between 
1975 and 2007,  patenting in computers and electronics expanded rapidly while 
patenting in  chemicals and petroleum was stagnant. As a result, computers 
 overtook  chemicals as the  sector that produces most patents in the early 1990s 
(online Appendix, Table A4).17 Panel B of Figure 1 plots the change in log  patents 
for 1991–2007 against the contemporaneous change in import penetration for 
computers and  electronics, chemicals and petroleum, and all other manufacturing 
industries. Since the growth in Chinese imports was much stronger in computers 
than in chemicals, the raw correlation between patenting and trade exposure at 
the broad sectoral level is positive. However, panel B of Figure 1 also indicates 
a positive raw correlation between sectoral patent growth in the pre-period of 
1975–1991 and the subsequent growth in Chinese import competition between 
1991 and 2007. The acceleration of patenting in the computer sector and the 
stagnation in the chemical sector thus each predate the rise in Chinese imports. 
Accounting for these secular (pre-)trends will be critical to our identification.
B. Import Competition and Patent Production: Baseline Estimates
Following equation (3), we estimate the impact of rising Chinese import 
 competition on patent production at the firm level. Panel A of Table 2 applies a 
bare-bones specification that includes no covariates beyond the change in import 
 p enetration and a year-specific constant.18 The conditional correlation between the 
change in firm patents and the change in industry import penetration is positive 
for 1991–1999 (column 1), negative for 1999–2007 (column 2), and negative for 
the stacked first-difference model that includes both periods with a separate time 
effect for each period (column 3). The difference between the OLS and IV estimates 
reported in rows (a) and (b) is modest.
Panel B of Table 2 confronts the pre-trends in patenting in the computer and 
chemical sectors documented in Figure 1, panel B. Merely including indicator 
 variables for these two trending sectors (computers and chemicals) reveals a robust 
negative relationship between changes in industry import penetration and changes in 
16 The literature offers several possible explanations for the slowdown in patenting in the early 2000s. 
See Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008); Gordon (2012); Boldrin and  Levine (2013); and Arora, Belenzon, and 
Patacconi (2018).
17 On the growth of information technology and software patents, see Jorgenson (2001) and Bessen and Hunt 
(2007).
18 The sample in Table 2 includes all firms that applied for at least one patent at the start or end of a given period. 
Continuous coverage in Compustat during the period is not required. Table A5 in the online Appendix alternatively 
considers a balanced panel of Compustat-covered firms that is also used for the analysis in Table 1.
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firm patenting. Specifically, both OLS and IV models (rows c and d) detect a sta-
tistically significant negative effect of Chinese import competition on firm-level 
domestic patent production in both subperiods and the stacked first-difference 
specification. IV estimates are uniformly larger (more negative) than their OLS 
counterparts, suggesting that the IV models purge simultaneity or measurement 
error (or both).
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Table 2—Effects of Chinese Import Competition on Firm-Level Patenting, 1991–2007 and 1975–1991 
(for falsification test): OLS and Instrumental Variables Models. Dependent Variable:  
Change in Corporate Patents by US-Based Inventors (percentage points) Relative to Mid-period 
Number of Patents


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Models without controls
(a) OLS, no controls 1.37 −0.45 −0.32 0.91 1.09 1.02 −1.34
(1.14) (0.22) (0.26) (0.33) (0.61) (0.45) (0.57)
(b) 2SLS, no controls 0.40 −0.29 −0.26 1.06 1.70 1.44 −1.70
(1.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.43) (0.68) (0.54) (0.67)
Panel B. Controlling for computer and chemical sector main effects
(c) OLS, 2 mfg sector dummies
 (computers, chemicals)
−0.87 −0.63 −0.91 0.36 −0.30 0.00 −0.92
(1.02) (0.12) (0.15) (0.25) (0.64) (0.38) (0.38)
(d) 2SLS, 2 mfg sector dummies 
 (computers, chemicals)
−2.36 −0.57 −1.25 0.36 0.17 0.27 −1.53
(1.40) (0.31) (0.53) (0.33) (0.61) (0.40) (0.56)
Panel C. Adding detailed controls
(e) 2SLS, 11 mfg sector dummies −1.77 −0.46 −1.10 0.54 0.47 0.52 −1.62
(1.16) (0.34) (0.51) (0.41) (0.68) (0.49) (0.62)
(f) 2SLS, 11 mfg sector  
 dummies + industry controls
−1.10 −0.50 −1.11 0.60 0.38 0.50 −1.61
(1.26) (0.34) (0.48) (0.44) (0.55) (0.43) (0.55)
(g) 2SLS, 11 mfg d. + industry/ 
 firm controls
−1.16 −0.52 −1.17 0.62 0.33 0.48 −1.65
(1.06) (0.34) (0.48) (0.42) (0.58) (0.43) (0.54)
(h) 2SLS, 11 mfg d. + industry/ 
 firm controls + technology  
 mix
−1.13 −0.72 −1.35 0.31 0.27 0.27 −1.63
(1.31) (0.35) (0.50) (0.34) (0.62) (0.39) (0.55)
(i) 2SLS, 11 mfg d. + industry/ 
 firm controls + technology  
 mix + 2 lags
−1.29 −0.80 −1.39 n/a n/a n/a n/a
(1.27) (0.39) (0.47)
Mean outcome variable 65.37 −7.61 24.42 −18.65 36.46 10.33 19.88
Observations 4,157 4,114 8,271 2,437 3,035 5,472 13,743
Notes: Each coefficient is derived from a separate firm-level regression of the relative change in patents on the 
change of Chinese import penetration. The relative change in patents is defined as the first difference in patents over 
a period t, t + 1, divided by the average number of patents across the two periods t and t + 1. Import  penetration 
increased by a mean of 2.07 (standard deviation 4.37) percentage points in 1991–1999, 6.46 (standard deviation 
14.34) in 1999–2007, and 4.54 (standard deviation 11.34) pooled over both periods. Columns 4–6 provide falsifi-
cation tests that regress the change in patents on the future increase in Chinese import penetration averaged over 
the 1991–1999 and 1999–2007 periods. Columns 3 and 6 present stacked first-differences models for the periods 
75–83/83–91 and 91–99/99– 07 and include a period dummy, while column 7 indicates the difference between the 
import  exposure coefficients of the column 3 and 6 models. Models (c) and (d) include dummies for the computer/ 
communication and chemical/petroleum industries. Model (e) includes a full set of dummies for 11 manufactur-
ing sectors. Model (f) additionally includes five industry-level controls for production characteristics (production 
workers as a share of total employment, log of average wage, and the ratio of capital to value added, all measured 
at the start of each period, as well as computer investment and investment in high-tech equipment, both expressed 
as a share of total investment and measured in 1990 for the models of columns 1–3 and in 1972 for the models of 
columns 4 –6). Model (g) additionally includes a dummy variable for US-headquartered firms and controls for the 
log US sales of a firm and for its global R&D expenditure expressed as a share of global sales. It also includes two 
dummy variables  indicating firms for which the two latter controls are not available in the Compustat data. Model 
(h)  additionally controls for the fraction of a firm’s patents that falls into each of the six major patent technology 
 categories defined by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), averaged over start-of-period and end-of-period patents. 
Model (i)  additionally controls for two eight-year lags of the outcome variable. All models are weighted by a firm’s 
US-inventor patents  averaged over the start and end of a period. Standard errors are clustered on four-digit SIC 
industries.
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We document the importance of pre-trends in columns 4–6 of Table 2, where 
we regress changes in firm-level patenting in the preceding 16-year (pre-China 
shock) period of 1975 to 1991 (in two 8-year intervals) on the change in indus-
try-level import penetration over the subsequent 1991–2007 period. In both  8-year 
time intervals as well as in the stacked model, and for both the OLS (row a) and 
2SLS (row b) specifications, we find a positive, statistically  significant relationship 
between changes in firm-level patenting and China import growth 16 years later. 
Notably, simply adding sector dummies for computers and  chemicals reduces this 
correlation to near zero and renders it statistically  insignificant across all columns 
(rows c and d). Column 7 shows that we can also eliminate the influence of these 
pre-trends by double differencing the post- and pre-China shock outcomes to 
 estimate the effect of China import competition on the change in firm-level patent-
ing in 1991–2007  relative to 1975–1991. This approach requires no sectoral-level 
dummies (rows a and b) and is little affected by their inclusion (rows c and d).
Panel C of Table 2 introduces additional controls that might  mitigate the 
 relationships detected in panel B, including (row e) dummy variables for 
11   manufacturing  sectors, (row f ) measures of industry factor and  technology 
intensity at the start of the period (share of production workers in industry 
employment, log  capital over value added, log average industry wage, computer 
investment as a share of overall investment, and high-tech equipment as a share 
of total investment),19 (row g) firm start-of-period characteristics (a dummy for 
US-headquartered firms, log US sales, and firm global R&D spending as a share 
of firm global sales), (row h) the  technology mix of a firm’s patents (the fractions 
of a firm’s patents that fall into each of six major technology fields), and (row i) 
the firm’s prior patent growth using the 8-year and 16-year lags of the  outcome 
 variable.20 Results from these specifications are comparable in magnitude to the 
parsimonious 2SLS model in row (d) that includes only sectoral dummies to 
absorb patenting trends in computers and chemicals.
C. Alternative Identification Strategies
We obtain causal identification by exploiting the external supply-driven  component 
of rising Chinese exports to the United States, identified by the  industry-level 
 covariance between rising Chinese import penetration to the United States and other 
high-income countries. This interpretation would be threatened if an exhaustion 
of  technological opportunities in specific industries occurring  worldwide rendered 
these “mined out” industries vulnerable to Chinese  competition. To address this 
 concern, we implement Pierce and Schott’s (2016) strategy of leveraging changes 
in trade policy uncertainty related to China’s attainment of PNTR with the United 
States in 2000 to instrument for the  acceleration of the growth in US industry import 
19 The first three variables are based on the NBER productivity database and the latter two on Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999).
20 Following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), we group patents into six technology fields based on their 
 primary technology class: chemical, computers and communications, drugs and medical, electrical and electronics, 
mechanical, and others. To maintain a constant sample size across specifications, missing values for the firm or 
industry controls are replaced with a value of zero, and an indicator variable for each missing control is added to 
the regression. 
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competition in the 2000s  versus the 1990s.21 As a second strategy, we exploit the 
phaseout of import  quotas from the MFA between 1999 and 2005 as an additional 
source of  within-industry changes in import exposure, following the approach of 
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen  (2016). These MFA quotas applied primarily to 
imports from the  textile, apparel, and leather sectors.
Table 3 reports side-by-side estimates of the impact of import competition 
on firm-level patenting, estimated first by OLS and then with each of our three 
 instrumentation strategies. Column 1 presents an OLS regression of the change 
in firm-level patenting on the change in import penetration and the full  vector of 
control variables from Table 2. This estimate detects a highly significant  negative 
 relationship between import competition and innovation that is  comparable in 
 magnitude to the corresponding 2SLS estimate in Table 2 (column 3, row h). 
Column 2 adds a full set of four-digit industry fixed effects that absorb any 
secular trend in patenting at the detailed industry level. The coefficient on the 
 interaction term between import exposure and the 1999–2007 indicator  variable 
in  column  2 is now identified by within-industry, over time changes in import 
 exposure and  patenting. The significant negative point estimate of − 0.71 means 
that  industries that saw a greater increase in import penetration in  1999–2007 
 relative to  1991–1999 saw a larger fall in patent production in the latter period 
 relative to the former.
Columns 3 and 4 apply our baseline China exposure instrument to this exercise.22 
These estimates are negative and highly significant, as expected. This  reduced 
form IV inference is also robust to the inclusion of four-digit industry main effects 
( column 4) so that identification comes from within-industry changes in import 
exposure during 1999–2007 versus 1991–1999.
We next implement the Pierce and Schott (2016) identification strategy by 
 exploiting the gap between most favored nation (MFN) and non-MFN tariffs as a 
shock to industry-level China import competition facing US firms after 2000. Since 
the elimination of the non-MFN Smoot–Hawley Tariff threat improved the com-
petitive position of Chinese exporters to the US market, this gap measure should 
have a negative impact on domestic US patenting following China’s attainment 
of PNTR in 2000. Because we have no strong prior on the relationship between 
the tariff gap and US domestic  innovation during the pre-2000 period, we include 
both a main effect for the  tariff gap instrument and an interaction of that instru-
ment with the  1999–2007  dummy.23 Column 5 shows that the tariff gap is posi-
tively correlated with  industry-level patenting growth during the 1990s, prior to 
China’s WTO accession. Relative to this trend, however, industries with higher tar-
iff gaps experienced a statistically significant slowdown in patenting in the 2000s 
21 Had China’s MFN trading status not been reauthorized in any year after 1980, its US tariff rates would have 
risen to the far-higher Smoot–Hawley rates set in the 1930s. Pierce and Schott (2016) and Handley and Limão 
(2017) show that US industries with higher gaps between non-MFN and MFN tariffs  experienced more rapid accel-
eration in Chinese imports after 2000. 
22 For comparability with subsequent columns, we report these models as reduced form OLS rather than 2SLS 
regressions.
23 By contrast, the expected impact of rising predicted Chinese import competition using our primary 
strategy does not differ across periods. When an interaction term with the 1999–2007 period is added to the 
regression in column 3 of Table 3, its coefficient is very small and imprecisely estimated (coefficient 0.04, 
standard error 1.75), suggesting that the causal effect is comparable across the two periods. 
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( second row, column 5). Paralleling earlier estimates, column 6 introduces industry 
fixed effects into the model. The coefficient of interest in this demanding specification 
(tariff gap  × post) remains negative and is marginally statistically significant.
In columns 7 and 8, we employ the instrument of Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 
(2016), which corresponds to the share of industry imports subject to MFA quotas 
prior to the 2005 MFA termination.24 As with the tariff gap instrument, we focus on 
the  contrast between the pre-removal period of 1991–1999 and the removal period of 
1999–2007. Following Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016), we analyze the impact 
of the removal of MFA quotas exclusively for the subsample of firms operating in 
MFA-affected industries. This reduces our sample from 8,271 to 495 observations, 
and the affected sectors account for just 4.9 percent of manufacturing patenting in 
1999 (bottom row of Table 3). Nevertheless, the column 7 estimate finds a negative 
association between MFA quotas and US patent growth during 1991–1999, which 
becomes ( marginally) significantly more negative in the 1999–2007 period when 
import  quotas are phased out. When four-digit industry fixed effects are added in 
column 8, the point estimate remains comparable but is less precisely estimated.
The second-to-last row of Table 3 shows that for all three sets of instruments 
employed, a one standard deviation increase in the trade exposure instrument is 
estimated to reduce patenting by 10 to 15 log points. Thus, whether we exploit 
24 The MFA quota fill rate data come from Pierce and Schott (2016). 
Table 3 —Response of Patenting to Alternative Measures of Trade Exposure, 1991–2007. Dependent 
Variable: Relative Change of Number of Corporate Patents by US-Based Inventors: OLS and OLS 
Reduced Form Estimates






trade relations  
tariff gap MFA quotas
(OLS) (OLS reduced form) (OLS reduced form) (OLS reduced form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure variable −1.17 −1.81 1.95 −3.28
(0.16) (0.69) (0.43) (2.22)
Exposure variable 
 × 1999–2007 period
−0.71 −1.63 −1.85 −0.92 −2.70 −2.27
(0.33) (0.74) (0.59) (0.56) (1.39) (2.11)
Full controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Descriptives for exposure variable in 1999–2007 period
Mean 6.46 5.62 30.00 1.47
Standard deviation (14.34) (9.17) (14.31) (4.49)
Impact of 1σ exposure −10.15 −14.91 −13.11 −10.21
Share of manufacturing patents in four-digit industries with nonzero exposure, year 1999
100% 100% 100% 4.9%
Notes: N = 8,271, except N = 495 in columns 7–8, which include only the three-digit sectors that comprise at 
least one MFA-affected four-digit industry. Every regression comprises two stacked first differences 1991–1999 and 
 1999–2007 and includes the full set of controls from model 3h in Table 2. Data on average fill rates of MFA quotas 
in 1999 and on normalized trade relations tariff gaps are based on Pierce and Schott (2016) and measured in per-
centage points. All models are weighted by a firm’s US-inventor patents averaged over the start and end of a period. 
Standard errors are clustered on four-digit SIC industries.
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the observed growth in US imports from China, the supply-driven surge in China’s 
exports to the United States and other high income countries, the reduction in 
China–US trade policy uncertainty following the grant of PNTR, or the removal of 
import quotas in MFA-affected industries, we find qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar deterrent effects on patenting by import-competing US firms.
As detailed in online Appendix Tables A5 and A6, our key finding that rising 
import competition reduces patenting by US firms is robust to variations of our basic 
approach, including restricting the analysis to only patents granted within six years 
of the application date, excluding patents from the computer or chemical  technology 
classes, using alternative firm weights (patent citations, R&D  expenditure, sales, 
no weights), and assigning Compustat firms to corresponding industries based on 
 historical industry codes or using fractional industry assignments according to firms’ 
sales shares across the industries in which they operate.25
A limitation of our firm-level analysis is that the analytic sample excludes  patents 
granted to firms that are not listed in Compustat. We overcome this limitation by 
estimating the effect of import competition on patenting at the technology class 
level. Exploiting the fact that every patent is assigned to a specific technology class, 
we calculate the import exposure facing each technology class by using the implicit 
mapping of patent classes to industries provided by our Compustat-patent matched 
data. Fitting (3) to patent counts at the technology class level, we find that tech-
nology classes with greater growth in import penetration during our window of 
1991–2007 experienced a substantial relative decline in total corporate patents (see 
online Appendix Table A7). Yet, no such negative effect is detected for patenting 
by noncorporate entities (e.g., government and universities). Our findings are thus 
 specific to private sector innovation and are unlikely to reflect a spurious correlation 
between declining innovation opportunities and rising trade exposure.
D. Which Firms Are Most Affected?
Our findings contrast with Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016), who report a 
positive effect of exposure to the removal of MFA quotas on patenting by European 
firms. These opposite-signed effects for the United States and Europe are not intrin-
sically at odds: as Aghion et al. (2005) emphasize, a marginal increase in competi-
tion may either spur or hinder innovation depending on the initial competitiveness 
of a market.26 Our findings could imply that US manufacturing industries largely 
locate on the downward-sloping leg of the Aghion et al. (2005) inverted U-shaped 
locus, where greater competition diminishes innovation.
To explore heterogeneous effects of competition on firm patenting, Table 4 
splits US firms within detailed industries into groups according to four  metrics: 
sales per worker, capital per work, profit over capital (ROI), and debt to equity. 
The odd-numbered columns estimate the effect of import competition on 
 patenting for firms that outperform their respective industry’s mean in terms of 
25 We also find that import competition has little impact on firm industry representation: conditional on sur-
vival,  Compustat firms do not appear to change industry in response to rising China competition.
26 It is further possible that the shock from Chinese trade competition may be less pronounced in Europe due 
to a more balanced trade relationship with China. Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum (2014) estimate that the labor 
market effects of Chinese trade for Germany, for instance, have been much less severe. 
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higher  productivity, capital intensity, profitability, and lower indebtedness. The 
 even-numbered columns present analogous regressions for the complementary 
samples. All four sample splits qualitatively confirm that firms with an initially 
weaker competitive position are more likely to be hurt by foreign competition, and 
this heterogeneity in treatment effects is statistically significant for the sample split 
by capital intensity. In Table A9 of the online Appendix, we extend the results in 
Table 4 by redefining the dependent variable to be the change in patents relative 
to the change in firm size (measured as sales or employment, either for the United 
States or globally). We find that for the initially weaker firms—when measured by 
capital intensity or profitability—the trade-induced contraction in patenting is not 
simply a by-product of a reduction in firm scale. Instead, these firms  experience a 
significant decline in patenting relative to sales and employment. Our analysis of 
firm heterogeneity suggests that rising import competition could, by culling the 
ranks of weaker incumbents, catalyze the reallocation of sales and  profits to the 
stronger firms that remain. While it does not definitively explain why results differ 
between the United States and Europe, it does support the notion that the effect of 
increased competition on innovation depends on initial conditions.27
IV. Discussion
We provide a comprehensive analysis of how the surge in import  competition from 
China affects both the inputs and outputs of US innovation activities. Accounting 
for the important confounding effects of industry pre-trends, we  demonstrate that 
27 In complementary analyses, Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) find that the sensitivity of capital investment to 
changes in industry import competition is greater in smaller relative to larger US manufacturing enterprises, and 
Aghion et al. (2018) find that patenting by French manufacturing firms responds more positively to export demand 
shocks in more productive relative to less productive establishments. 
Table 4—Effect of Chinese Import Competition on Patenting 1991–2007: Sample Splits by Initial 
Firm Sales/Worker, Capital/Worker, ROI, and Debt/Equity. Dependent Variable: Relative Change 
in Patents
Firm labor productivity and  
capital intensity Firm profitability and leverage

















∆ US industry exposure to  
 Chinese imports
−1.11 −2.32 −0.01 −2.41 −0.86 −2.06 −0.86 −2.92
(0.79) (1.38) (1.01) (0.55) (0.57) (0.72) (0.40) (1.47)
Test for equal coeff. p = 0.522 p = 0.034 p = 0.192 p = 0.149
Mean outcome variable 27.27 3.29 29.80 7.83 20.03 7.58 19.18 14.23
Observations 1,348 2,738 1,529 2,560 1,887 2,493 3,154 766
Notes: Every regression comprises two stacked first differences, 1991–1999 and 1999–2007, and includes the full 
set of controls from model 3h in Table 2. Columns 1–2, 3–4, 5–6, and 7–8 split the firm sample into firms whose 
sales per employee, capital per employee, ROI, or debt-to-equity ratio is above/below the  patent-weighted industry 
average in the start-of-period year. All models are weighted by a firm’s US-inventor  patents  averaged over the start 
and end of a period. Standard errors are clustered on four-digit SIC industries.
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the negative impact of Chinese import competition on innovation at the firm and 
technology class level is robust to a wide range of regression  specifications and 
identification strategies, that it is evident on both output ( patenting) and input (R&D 
expenditure) margins, and that it applies to  private sector patent production but 
not patenting by universities or government, consistent with a competitive market 
response. These findings do not constitute a welfare analysis of the impact of com-
petition on domestic innovation since they do not capture, for example, dynamic 
responses that may ultimately include the culling of weaker firms and the entry of 
robust new innovators. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that the innovation response 
of US firms more exposed to rising market competition from China has been 
 substantially and unambiguously negative.
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